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Abstract 
Based on a social-constructivist conceptualization of knowledge as residing in groups of 
practitioners, epistemic communities, this paper proposes a new perspective on the knowl-
edge based view of the firm and sketches the outline of a new research agenda. It argues 
that the cost of governing knowledge processes depends as much on the cognitive back-
ground of the exchange partners as on the tacitness of the knowledge. Firms exist because 
they may form epistemic communities in their own right with enabling and motivational 
properties superior to those of markets in the governance of knowledge processes across 
epistemic boundaries. Establishing a firm as an epistemic community requires transaction 
specific investments that are difficult to realize under market forms of governance. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the fundamental aspects of the evolutionary perspective in economic theory (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982) was the conceptualization of business firms as “organizations that know how to do 
things” (Winter, 1987). Inspired by evolutionary theory, ‘knowledge’ and ´capabilities’ became 
central elements in the advancement of the so-called knowledge- or competence-based theory of the 
firm. Seen variously as an alternative or a complement to the dominating transaction-cost approach, 
this line of research was premised on the conviction that the possession and accumulation of ‘know-
ledge’, ‘competences’ and ‘capabilities’ are fundamental characteristics of firms, and should there-
fore have significant roles in theory addressing the rationale for their existence, the determinants of 
their boundaries and their internal organization.   
 
This emphasis on firms’ internal operations could be traced to Edith Penrose’s (1959) seminal work 
and was in contrast to the neo-classical conceptualization of the firm as a production function – a 
‘black box’ transforming inputs to outputs (Pitelis and Wahl, 1998). In Penrose’s tradition, but 
unlike Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985) and transaction cost economics, most versions of knowl-
edge-based theory focused on the costs of operations rather than those of exchange (Pitelis, 2004). 
Hierarchical organization was seen not as a means to align incentives and reduce opportunism; its 
primary role was to facilitate knowledge sharing and knowledge creation through the on-going 
proximity of interacting and interdependent human resources:  
When men have become used to working in a particular firm or with a particular group of 
other men in a firm, they become individually and as a group more valuable to the firm 
because the range of services they can render is enhanced by their knowledge of their fellow 
workers, or the methods of the firm, of the best way of doing things in the particular set of 
circumstances in which they are working. (Penrose, 1959, p. 52) 
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The idea that firms offer conditions conducive to efficient knowledge governance gained wide-
spread acceptance and gave rise to a rich empirical and theoretical literature. Since Penrose, a main 
line of argument was that much of the knowledge in firms is experience-based, tacit, socially com-
plex and therefore difficult to transfer or apply to outside settings (Buckley and Casson, 1976; 
Penrose, 1959; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1993, 1996). According to ‘knowledge based’ theory, 
firms exist because they provide means to manage knowledge-intensive processes more efficiently 
than is possible through market transactions (Conner, 1991; Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Foss 1996; 
Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004, Kogut and Zander, 
1992, 1993, 1996; Madhok, 1996). The contributors to this approach – sometimes bridging earlier 
insights from transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1975, 1985) – considerably 
enriched our understanding of the significance of knowledge processes, especially as regards the 
rationale for the existence of firms and the determinants of their boundaries.   
 
However, in spite of many commonalities and reasonably narrow aims, the knowledge based theory 
of the firm remained a rather diverse literature (Kaplan, Schenkel, von Krogh and Weber, 2001). 
Some contributions emphasized the efficiency of firms in the exploitation of existing knowledge 
(Kogut and Zander, 1993; Winter and Szulanski, 2001); others viewed their superiority in the crea-
tion of new knowledge (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Kogut and Zander, 1992). In some accounts, 
firms were argued to be superior vehicles for the transfer of knowledge within functional or occupa-
tional groups whose members have the same training and professional experience (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992); others emphasized their role in facilitating integration of specialist knowledge 
across different such groups, where lack of common expertise makes knowledge-sharing difficult 
(Grant, 1996a, 1996b).  
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Moreover, there was little agreement as to the definitions of central concepts, such as ‘knowledge’, 
‘competences’ and ‘capabilities’ and ambiguity also as to the relevant level of analysis (Felin and 
Foss, 2005; Felin and Hesterly, 2007). For some scholars, knowledge was seen to reside in individ-
uals (Felin and Foss, 2005; Grant, 1966a), but most contributions took a more collectivist perspec-
tive, emphasizing – following Nelson and Winter (1982) – the role of firm-level, social knowledge 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Spender, 1966a). The conceptualizations 
employed were often highly abstract ones, typically assuming that knowledge can be meaningfully 
discussed without reference to its content and context. Many contributions assumed that different 
‘types’ of knowledge have different governance implications, commonly  emphasizing the distinc-
tion between ‘tacit’ and ‘explicit’ knowledge (Polanyi, 1962, 1966; Nonaka, 1994), but sometimes 
using more elaborate classifications (Ancori, Bureth and Cohendet, 2000; Boisot, 1995; Johnson, 
Lorenz and Lundvall, 2002; Sanchez, 1997; Spender, 1996b, 1998).  The perspective typically took, 
at least implicitly, an essentially static view on knowledge, assuming that its basic characteristics, 
such as its degree of articulation, remain constant over time1. Focusing on cognitive and stable 
aspects of knowledge, this ‘taxonomic’ perspective (Tsoukas, 1996, p. 13) contrasted with a parallel 
stream of research in the sociology of knowledge, which emphasized the practical aspects of 
knowledge (Blackler, 1995; Brown and Duguid, 1991, 1998, 2001a, 2001b; Dougherty, 1992; Lave 
and Wenger, 1991; Orlikowski, 2002; Tsoukas, 1996; Wenger, 1998). Often adopting constructivist 
conceptualizations, ‘knowing’ was here seen as processual and evolving, inherently provisional, 
and situated (socially and technically).          
 
Given this state of affairs, it is hardly surprising that the knowledge based view has been subject to 
much criticism. In the judgment of one recent review,  
 4
… the knowledge-based theory of the firm seems more like a theoretical patchwork than a 
solid body of theoretical knowledge. In effect, empirical research is scant, and we should not 
expect a successful empirical project unless we are able to resolve some of the more funda-
mental controversies at the present time. (Kaplan et al., 2001, p. 3) 
At the core of the criticism have been two related issues. The first has concerned “…obscure and 
often tautological definitions of key terms; and failures of operationalization” (Williamson, 1999, p. 
1093) which have been claimed to have hindered the empirical testing needed for the field to 
advance (Kaplan et al., 2001, p. 9). The second has focused on the “micro-foundations” of the 
theory, i.e. the assumptions about the motivations and cognitive characteristics of individuals and 
the nature of the links between the individual and collective levels (Felin and Foss, 2005; Felin and 
Hesterly, 2007). “The problem”, as Teppo Felin and Nicolai Foss (2005, p. 444) put it, “is that 
because routines and capabilities do not have an anchor in individual antecedents, they can be virtu-
ally anything at the organizational level.” 
 
Taking its lead from this criticism, this paper departs from the taxonomic, static, and abstract view 
of knowledge characteristic of inherited theory. It is premised on a social-constructivist and con-
textual conceptualization of knowledge as residing in groups of practitioners, epistemic communi-
ties, an idea first suggested by the German sociologist Burkart Holzner (1968). The objective is to 
explore the consequences of adopting Holzner’s perspective on knowledge to the questions raised in 
the knowledge-based approach to the theory of the firm, to demonstrate how this helps resolve some 
of the fundamental ambiguities of the approach, and to explicate the contours of the research agenda 
this invites.   
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The argument proceeds as follows: The next two sections discuss the nature and implications of 
Holzner’s constructivist conceptualization of knowledge and how it relates to the ones employed in 
earlier literature. In section 4, the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ is applied to the knowledge 
governance issues addressed in some well known contributions to the knowledge-based theory of 
the firm. It identifies four distinct types of knowledge processes, each with its own characteristics 
and strategic significance. The analysis suggests that firms are superior to markets primarily in the 
governance of knowledge processes requiring the integration, combination and reconciliation of 
knowledge across different epistemic communities. The implications of this are discussed in section 
5, which argues that firms can meaningfully be seen as epistemic communities in their own right, 
established precisely because they can help overcome differences in their members’ specialized 
expertise. Section 6 outlines the core elements of the new research agenda that the proposed per-
spective seems to invite, borrowing for the characterization a set of six ‘key moves’ originally pro-
posed by Oliver Williamson (1999) in a paper critically ‘benchmarking’ ‘the competence perspec-
tive’ against the ‘governance perspective’.2 Section 7 offers a brief concluding summary. 
 
2. Epistemic communities  
2.1 Defining ‘knowledge’ 
Most contributions to knowledge-based theory assumed a central characteristic of knowledge to be 
its degree of ‘tacitness’ – the extent to which it can be (or has been) articulated and codified. This 
practice can be traced to Sidney Winter’s (1987) supposition that explicit knowledge is not only 
easier and less costly to deliberately pass on and replicate than is tacit knowledge, but it is also 
more susceptible to imitation. Conversely, he argued, tacit knowledge is more difficult both to 
transfer and to imitate than is explicit knowledge; it can only be passed on through costly face-to-
face interaction. Being difficult to move or apply outside the group or context where it resides, tacit 
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knowledge was assumed to be ‘sticky’ and therefore a potential source of competitive advantage 
(Szulanski, 1996; von Hippel, 1994). As formulated by Spender and Grant (1996, p. 8), a basic 
proposition of this line of thinking was that “... [tacit] knowledge which is embodied in individual 
and organizational practices… cannot be readily articulated. Such knowledge is of critical strategic 
importance because, unlike explicit knowledge, it is both inimitable and appropriable.” Taking the 
argument one step further, the ‘knowledge based approach’ to the theory of the firm argued that the 
very existence of firms is due to their ability to manage knowledge, especially in its tacit forms, 
more cheaply and efficiently than is possible under other forms of governance. 
 
In contrast, the social-constructivist conceptualization adopted here suggests that obstacles to know-
ledge transfer arise not only from ‘tacitness’, but also – and often more importantly – from the fact 
that all knowledge is inherently context dependent and that knowledge that is recognized as relevant 
and useful in one context may be totally meaningless in another. The knowledge context is defined 
by the ‘epistemic community’ where it resides (Holzner, 1968).3 Epistemic communities consist of 
individuals with identical or similar ‘frames of reference’ and cognitive ‘orientation systems’. 
These are associated with specific social roles, such as those of different occupational groups, and 
are acquired in a process of cognitive socialization, usually through a combination of formal train-
ing and on-the-job experience. 
Roles may… be viewed as frames of reference and theories in terms of which the role occu-
pants deal with the situations which come in their way. … [S]ocial roles in their orienta-
tional function provide epistemologies, basic categorical schemes, preference systems and 
methodologies through which the role occupant organizes encountered experiences and pro-
vides explanations for them… The guard in a zoo, the administrator in a complex organiza-
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tion, the plumber, all possess more or less specialized frames of reference and explanatory 
theories which presumably equip them to do their jobs. (Holzner, 1968, p. 65) 
 Holzner (1968, pp. 104 ff.) linked the formation and differentiation of epistemic communities to 
the historical evolution of ‘exchange mechanisms’ from “traditional ascriptive-reciprocal interac-
tions within a village or group of villages” to the complex mixture of markets mechanisms and 
planning characteristic of the present day. This development, he argued, was associated with an 
increasing specialization of knowledge, as the importance of non-autonomous physical labor was 
replaced by work situations requiring increasingly specialized knowledge-based skills (Holzner, 
1968, p.127). 
 
The reality constructs accepted (believed to hold ‘true’) by an epistemic community reflect the spe-
cific epistemic criteria of validity and reliability that it subscribes to (Holzner, 1968, pp. 51-59; 
Holzner and Marx, 1979, pp. 103-106). The empirical tests and institutionalized methodological 
procedures employed in scientific communities are just one example. In communities defined 
through their preoccupation with a specific work practice, especially those relying to a great extent 
on tacit knowledge, the pre-dominant ‘reality test’ tends to be pragmatic, i.e. whether or not a par-
ticular procedure ‘works’. Knowledge will be judged to be ‘true’ to the extent that its application 
results in desired results with a degree of accuracy deemed to be sufficient. These types of reality 
tests are often combined with deductive or logical verification of the symbolic and theoretical con-
sistency of knowledge propositions. However, not all reality tests are rational. Sometimes, reality 
constructs are accepted because they emanate from or are approved by some accepted authority. 
Authoritative reality tests are common, for example, in religious organizations, political parties and 
bureaucratic structures.  
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The view of ‘knowledge’ implied by Holzner’s analysis of epistemic communities and adopted in 
much subsequent research on the sociology of knowledge differs from Plato’s classical definition of 
‘knowledge’ as ‘justified true belief’. As expressed by Holzner and John Marx (1979: 93) 
“…knowledge as the subject matter of sociological inquiry is simply what a group or society takes 
as knowledge.” It is inherently provisional, context dependent and social (Berger and Luckmann, 
1996/1991).   
 
2.2 Delimiting epistemic communities  
As employed in the subsequent literature, neither the concept ‘epistemic community’, nor the 
related, more widely accepted ‘community of practice’, introduced by Lave and Wenger (1991), are 
altogether unambiguous. There is ambiguity concerning (1) the explicit or implied significance of 
tacit knowledge in such groups – as opposed to knowledge expressed in symbolic form, (2) the 
relation of epistemic communities to knowledge creation, and (3) their degree of geographic local-
ization. In consequence, there is ambiguity also (4) regarding the operational question as to how 
‘epistemic’ communities can be distinguished both from one another and from other kinds of social 
groups. In order to found the discussion on conceptually firm ground, each of these issues will be 
discussed in turn.  
 
2.2.1 The role of tacit knowledge 
Holzner’s ‘epistemic communities’ bear strong resemblances to the ‘communities of practice’ and 
related phenomena discussed in the more recent research in the sociology of knowledge (Brown and 
Duguid, 1991, 1998, 2001a, 2001b; Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger 1998).4 Like epistemic 
communities, communities of practice consist of people engaged in a common enterprise and mas-
tering a shared repertoire of skills, thereby developing a common understanding of what the com-
 9
munity does, the means and methods it employs, the standards by which its activity is judged, and 
how it relates to other communities and their practices (Brown and Duguid, 1998; Lave and 
Wenger, 1991). However, in contrast to this vein of research which tended to emphasize the role of 
tacit knowledge (Delamont and Atkinson, 2001; Duguid, 2005), Holzner’s (1968) original discus-
sion focused almost entirely on explicit knowledge expressed in symbolic form. Only in passing did 
he recognize the significance of implicit knowledge and role-embedded and experience-based skill 
and judgment, acquired through situated apprentice-type learning in a process of ‘cognitive sociali-
zation’ (Holzner, 1968, pp. 28 ff.), a close parallel to the ‘legitimate peripheral learning’ referred to 
by Lave and Wenger (1991): 
Certain frames of reference, while always having the status of the context of inquiry and 
therefore not reflected on during its progress, are explicitly codified and articulated. Other 
frames of reference remain implicit and lack specific symbolic articulation. The modern pro-
fessionals will tend to be able to discuss their frames of reference with much greater preci-
sion than traditional craftsmen can. (Holzner and Marx, 1979, p. 100) 
Somewhat at odds with Holzner’s original emphasis on explicit knowledge but in line with the sen-
timent expressed in this paragraph and with more recent contributions, I shall in the following 
assume that the knowledge shared in epistemic communities include both tacit elements and explicit 
cognitive schemata, ranging from simple rules of thumb to explicit scientific theory (Håkanson, 
2007).  
 
2.2.2 Knowledge creation 
A further ambiguity concerns the relation of ‘epistemic communities’ to knowledge creation. 
Holzner and Marx (1979, p.108) provided the following definition: 
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The term epistemic communities… designates knowledge-oriented communities in which 
cultural standards and social arrangements interpenetrate around a primary commitment to 
epistemic criteria in knowledge production and application” (Holzner and Marx, 1979, p. 
108, italics in the original).  
This usage parallels Karin Knorr Cetina’s later (1999) discussion of ‘epistemic cultures’ and that of 
some subsequent accounts, where the term ‘epistemic communities’ was used to denote communi-
ties with a primary commitment to deliberate knowledge creation (see e.g. Cowan, David and Foray 
(2000), Amin and Cohendet (2004) and Cohendet and Llerena (2003)). However, for the present 
purpose, I will assume that to varying degrees, all epistemic communities engage in learning and 
knowledge creation – both by deliberate intention and through accident. This is in line with 
Holzner’s original formulation, where “knowledge orientated communities”, such as scientific ones, 
were only one example of epistemic communities, others including “…religious communities, work 
communities, some ideological communities and the like (Holzner, 1968, p. 69)”.  
 
2.2.3 Geographic localization 
The term ‘community of practice’ was usually taken to denote tightly knit work groups or func-
tional departments, characterized by engagement in a common enterprise and mastery of a shared 
repertoire of skills (Brown and Duguid, 1998; Orr, 1996; Wenger, 1998). Mutual engagement 
requires interaction and is therefore favored by geographical proximity. But once the skills of the 
community have been acquired, mutual engagement does not necessarily require face-to-face inter-
action but can – “given the right context” – take place over the phone, by email or over the radio 
(Wenger, 1998, p. 74). As Paul Duguid (2005, p. 113) noted, most professional communities extend 
beyond individual organizations and localities: “…not all practice is local. In many areas, the prac-
tice is shared widely among practitioners, most of whom will never come into contact with one 
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another.” This conceptualization parallels that of Holzner (1968, p. 140), and I will in the following 
use the term ‘epistemic community’ to denote groups of people mastering the tools, codes and theo-
ries of a common practice (as defined below) regardless of their geographical location and the 
intensity of mutual contact that they may maintain. The term ‘community of practice’ I will reserve 
for geographically localized work groups, characterized by frequent, usually personal interaction 
among its members.5  
 
2.2.4 Operational delimitation 
According to Holzner (1968, pp. 68f.), the central criterion for the identification and delimitation of 
a community of practice was the similarity of its members in terms of their cognitive frames of 
reference, role orientations and the ‘reality tests’ they employ to validate their knowledge. ‘Similar-
ity’, of course, is a relative concept, and implicit in his discussion was the idea that epistemic com-
munities can be distinguished at different levels of detail:  
…the actual degree of similarity in the frames of reference with which role occupants 
approach the situation is a matter of wide variation. There are several possibilities here: the 
first one is the complete identity, or a high degree of similarity of the orientation systems. 
Fellow believers in a common faith, persons with the same occupation and training may be 
illustrations of this category… Where we find such similarity of frames of reference, of 
epistemologies, we find naturally also agreement on the application of similar reality tests. 
In the case of organized social arrangements which maintain similar epistemologies we may 
speak of ‘epistemic communities’ such as that of science, of organized religion, an ideologi-
cal following and the like. (Holzner, 1968, p. 68) 
The problems associated with the operational delimitation of epistemic communities resemble those 
encountered in the classification of ‘industries’. The aim is to amalgamate on the basis of some 
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defined criteria of similarity the smallest units of observation – individual products or establish-
ments in the case of industries, individual persons or communities of practice in the case of epis-
temic communities – into ever larger groupings. In both cases, the theoretical meanings of the basic 
constructs are relatively fixed, but in their empirical application, precise operationalizations into 
broad or narrower categories will depend on the purpose of the enquiry, the availability of data and 
the time and resources available. Within the limits of such restraints, identification of epistemic 
communities can potentially be accomplished through a whole range of both primary methodologies 
(e.g. interviews or questionnaires) and secondary data (e.g. membership in professional associations 
or occupational census data)6. Like in the case of industries, the resultant classifications can be 
defined with different degrees of precision, i.e. into narrow, rather homogenous categories or 
broader more heterogeneous ones.     
 
3. Epistemic communities as interpretation systems    
Epistemic communities provide ‘interpretation systems’, which help their members to interpret the 
world and provide meaning to their activities (Daft and Weick, 1984; Holzner, 1968, pp. 45 ff.). 
Their ‘practice’ is always (negotiated) social practice and includes both explicit and tacit compo-
nents. Epistemic communities are where knowledge resides, skills are applied and articulation and 
knowledge creation can take place. Individuals belong simultaneously to several epistemic commu-
nities, all of which affect their conceptions of identity and associated world views:  
The organization of the cognitive field… emerges as a process of constant structuring and 
ordering, or interpretation. It is guided by the repertory of role-specific frames of reference 
offered to a person by his social participations, and by the inherent organization of these 
frames of reference into major institutional and cultural domains. (Holzner, 1968, p. 44) 
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In Holzner’s (1968, pp. 46 ff.) conceptualization, the frames of reference of an epistemic commu-
nity have both cognitive and practical properties – to borrow Wanda Orlikowski’s (2002, p. 250) 
apt phrase, knowledge and practice are ‘reciprocally constitutive’.7 They include both ‘theories’ 
(including scientific theories but also, for example, magical and religious ones), which summarize 
the reality constructs of the community and rationales for their explanation, and ‘active proce-
dures’, in the form of epistemologies and methods.8 ‘Theories’ specify (1) accepted “orientations” 
towards and “preference systems” regarding the matters relevant to a community. They also include 
(2) “categorical schemes”, permitting symbolic descriptions of what is apprehended, and (3) “ex-
planatory systems”, providing their members with communicable explanations of experienced 
events. The “procedural” aspects of a community’s frames of reference include “…an epistemologi-
cal position… which defines implicitly or explicitly its relevant criteria of ‘truth’”, identifying 
accepted methodologies and prescribing how events and experiences are recorded and classified. 
 
    
DATA CAPABILITIESCODES
TOOLS
THEORY
 
 
 
Figure 1 The functional elements of epistemic communities (Adapted from Daft and Weick, 
1984) 
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 Slightly rephrasing Holzner’s argument, epistemic communities can parsimoniously be defined and 
delineated by their generation, maintenance and mastery of three elements, here labeled theory, 
codes and tools, each incorporating both explicit and tacit components (Figure 1) (Håkanson, 2007). 
I use the concepts broadly. Thus, ‘theory’ refers to the cognitive frames of reference that enable a 
community to make sense of the messages exchanged within it. It includes tacit cultural elements – 
such as ‘mental maps’ and inherited rules-of-thumb but also explicit statements and models of the 
causalities deemed relevant to the practice. ‘Codes’ refer to all symbolic means, through which the 
community communicates with its environment and its members with one another, including both 
ordinary language and more specialized varieties, such as mathematics, chemical formulae or com-
puter code – and pictorial representations (graphs, maps, diagrams and pictures, etc.). ‘Tools’, 
finally, is used to denote the physical artifacts that the community employs in the execution of its 
tasks and the development of its practice, including “instrumentalities”, tools that permit observa-
tion of phenomena outside the realm of unaided sense perception (Price, 1984), and the artifacts that 
hold a community’s physical “memory” – both the tools and machines which embody its experience 
and technology and the physical records in which these have been codified.9  
 
4. Epistemic communities and knowledge governance    
In spite of the argument’s intuitive plausibility, there was little agreement in the knowledge-based 
literature as to precisely how, when and why the cooperation and coordination of individual experts 
can be more efficiently achieved within a firm than through as set of mutual contracts. According to 
Kogut and Zander (1992, p. 390) “[c]omplex organizations exist as communities within which 
varieties of functional expertise can be communicated and combined by a common language and 
organizing principles.”  But why precisely, could these conditions not equally well be realized over 
the market? As Nicolai Foss (1996, p. 472) pointed out, “[a]gents (human resources) could simply 
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meet under the same factory roof, own their own pieces of physical capital equipment or rent it to 
each other, and develop value-enhancing higher order organizing principles among themselves (as a 
team)”. Many of the fundamental premises of the knowledge-based approach have remained under 
dispute:  Under what conditions are firms superior to markets in the governance of knowledge 
processes? Does this superiority apply to all kinds of knowledge processes or only to some? What 
role, if any, does transaction cost considerations have?  
 
Burkart Holzner’s (1968) concept of epistemic communities and the social constructivist conception 
of knowledge that it implies invite a new perspective in addressing these questions. Rather than the 
more common focus on the ‘tacitness’ of knowledge, it directs attention to its socially and situation-
ally context dependent nature and to the fundamental difference between knowledge processes 
within and across epistemic boundaries.       
 
Epistemic communities are significant, first, because membership affects the ability to exchange 
knowledge. Mastery of the explicit codes, theory and tools of a community enables the members of 
a community to transmit and receive codified knowledge as ‘information’ (Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Moreover, exposure to the same type of experiential learning processes 
ensures that much of the tacit knowledge of the community is also held in common (Boisot, 1995; 
Sanchez, 1997). This is important because it facilitates the transfer also of incompletely codified 
knowledge, such as that embodied in physical artifacts.10 Thus, both through voluntary sharing and 
through involuntary imitation, community membership provides potential access to the knowledge 
available to all communities of practice within the same epistemic community.   
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Second, epistemic communities also provide identity to their members, thereby influencing their 
readiness and motivation to share knowledge (Buckley and Carter, 2000; Fiol, 1991; Holzner, 1968: 
94 ff.; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Osterloh and Frey, 2000; Kogut and Zander, 1996; Wenger, 
1998).11 As emphasized by Lave and Wenger (1991, p. 53) “… identity, knowing, and social 
membership entail one another.” ‘Learning’ takes place not only in the mind of the learner. It is also 
a social process of becoming an ‘insider’: 
Learners do not receive or even construct abstract, “objective,” individual knowledge; 
rather, they learn to function in a community. They acquire that particular community’s 
subjective viewpoint and learn to speak its language. Learners are acquiring not explicit, 
formal “expert knowledge,” but the embodied ability to behave as community members. 
(Brown and Duguid 1991, p. 48)  
Of course, identities are never singular. Individuals belong to and identify with multiple epistemic 
communities, both occupational and private ones. Occupational identities themselves are often 
complex. Individuals tend to identify, for example, both with their professions and with the firms 
where they are employed, but occupational identities may also be linked to work groups, functional 
departments or geographical sites (Fiol, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1996). In interaction with others, 
individuals situationally select the frame of reference appropriate to the group and structural context 
at hand, while reconciling their actions with other such frames which are also part of their personal 
history and identity (Holzner, 1968, pp. 69 ff.). 
 
4.1 Four types of knowledge processes  
As already indicated, some contributions to the ‘knowledge-based approach’ focused on the 
exploitation of existing capabilities, others on the creation of new ones. In the terms of the theoreti-
cal framework outlined here, some discussed the knowledge exchange within epistemic communi-
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ties; others emphasized the problem of communicating knowledge across epistemic boundaries. 
Combining these two dimensions yields a simple typology of basic knowledge processes and 
knowledge governance problems (Figure 2).  
Exploitation
of existing
capabilities
within epistemic
communities
Creation
of new
capabilities
Replication
Kogut & Zander 1993
Zollo & Winter 2002
Integration
Grant 1996a; 1996b
Articulation
Cowan et al. 2000
Håkanson 2007
Combination
Nickerson & Zenger 2004
Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998
between epistemic
communities
 
Figure 2  Typology of knowledge processes 
 
4.1.1 Articulation  
Knowledge creation within epistemic communities takes place through articulation of the tacit 
knowledge informing craftsman-like practice into explicit codes, tools and theory (Balconi, Pozzali 
and Viale, 2007; Cohendet and Meyer-Krahmer, 2001; Cowan et al., 2000; Håkanson, 2007; 
Prencipe and Tell, 2001; Zollo and Winter, 2002). Explication of tacit knowledge requires the exis-
tence or creation of a suitable code. Much knowledge can be articulated in ordinary language, pro-
vided that a suitable vocabulary exists. But oftentimes more dedicated codes are needed, such as 
blueprints and other pictorial representations, flow charts or computer programs. At its most basic 
level, articulation involves classification, standardization and naming (Bowker and Star, 1999) and 
– as discussed below – the creation and definition of interfaces of the activities of the practice. It 
facilitates the division of labor and the exploitation of related benefits, such as those associated with 
specialization, replication and control (Håkanson, 2007). Articulation implies knowledge creation 
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in that it allows tasks to be accomplished that could not previously be accomplished or not accom-
plished so well. By definition, articulation leads to an increase in the amount of explicit knowledge 
available to the community. But since the application of new, more explicit theory, tools and codes 
creates new experiential learning opportunities, articulation increases also the tacit components of a 
community’s knowledge base (Boisot, 1995; Zollo and Winter, 2002).  
 
4.1.2 Replication  
Replication, the duplication or reproduction of organizational capabilities, is a prerequisite for 
growth and, hence, a fundamental business process (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Like articulation it 
is an activity that takes place within epistemic communities. Sometimes, transfer and replication of 
capabilities can be accomplished through the mere transmission of an artifact or a set of blueprints, 
but the transfer of less completely codified technologies may require the personal, face-to-face 
engagement of the partners to the exchange (Baden-Fuller and Winter, 2005; Kogut and Zander, 
1993; Simonin, 1999; Winter and Szulanski, 2001;). Since the ease of replication is related to the 
degree of articulation, the desire to facilitate and perfect the former is often an inducement to invest 
the time and money needed to increase the latter (Cowan et al., 2000; Håkanson, 2007; Winter and 
Szulanski, 2001; Zollo and Winter, 2002). 
 
4.1.3 Integration  
The activities of firms require the mobilization and coordination of specialized and diverse exper-
tise. Luckily, integration of knowledge and other types of coordinated action between members of 
different epistemic communities do not require that each acquire the knowledge of every other: 
Although knowledge can be learned more effectively in specialized fashion, its use to 
achieve high living standards requires that a specialist somehow use the knowledge of other 
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specialists. This cannot be done by learning what others know, for that would undermine 
gains from specialized learning. It cannot be done only by purchasing information in the 
form of facts, for in many cases the theory that links facts must be mastered if facts are to be 
put to work (Demsetz 1988, p. 157, italics in original). 
In the words of Boland and Tenkasi (1995, p. 356), integration of knowledge across epistemic com-
munities involves ‘perspective taking’, a process “in which the perspective of another [community] 
can be taken into account as part of a community’s way of knowing.” Since it involves the coordi-
nation between epistemic communities, among experts with different theories, codes and tools, as 
well as different value systems and objectives, knowledge integration is distinctly different from 
that of passing on, or replicating knowledge within such communities; it is often difficult or impos-
sible to achieve unless requisite ‘integrating devices’ are in place (Grant, 1996a; Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967).  
 
4.1.4 Combination  
In line with Schumpeter’s (1934) classical definition of innovation, a number of authors (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992; Grant 1996b; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Nickerson and 
Zenger, 2004) discussed the relative advantages of firms in the generation of new capabilities 
through new combinations of specialized knowledge. As Carliss Baldwin (2008) recently empha-
sized, the optimal governance of combination, i.e. the creation of new configurations of knowledge 
from different disciplinary and functional areas, can be influenced by deliberate design decisions. 
The ease of carrying out such combinations and the associated transaction costs (both the ‘mun-
dane’ ones of “standardizing, counting and compensating” and those associated with the risk of 
opportunism) depend on the degree of articulation and codification of the underlying knowledge 
bases. Articulation and improved theoretical understanding make possible the development of 
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design rules which can provide well defined interfaces between epistemic communities. This faci-
litates the specialization of cognitive work and increases the feasibility of knowledge combinations 
through the uncomplicated transfer across epistemic boundaries of physical artifacts, such as blue-
prints or components (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). More com-
plicated are the management and choice of governance for innovation processes based on know-
ledge combinations, where epistemic interfaces have not been defined (or are impossible to define 
due to the inherent uncertainty).  
 
4.2 Governance of knowledge processes 
Articulation and replication involve the cooperative efforts of experts pursuing the common goals 
of a shared practice. As members of the same epistemic community they tend to have similar back-
grounds in terms of formal training and job experience. They interpret their common practice in 
similar ways and share mastery of its codes and tools. Within epistemic communities, codified 
knowledge is “...alienable from the person who wrote the code” and “...can be transmitted without 
loss of integrity once the syntactical rules required for deciphering it are known” (Kogut and Zander 
1992, pp. 386 f.). Moreover, engagement in the same practice provides also similar types of experi-
ential or tacit knowledge. Replication through imitation also of incompletely codified capabilities 
between communities of practice within the same epistemic community can often be accomplished 
with relative ease regardless of their geographical locations and organizational memberships. In 
consequence, the governance of such activities takes a multitude of forms, ranging from the virtual 
communities developing open source software, over government financed research institutions to 
the R&D departments of private firms. Appropriability conditions and transaction cost considera-
tions appear decisive for the choice of governance. 
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In contrast, combination and integration refers to knowledge processes involving professional 
experts from different epistemic communities, each with its own vocabulary, set of theories and 
tools. As recent research in the sociology of organizational knowledge has demonstrated, in the 
absence of well-defined interfaces, integration and exchange of knowledge across the boundaries of 
functional departments and professional expertise do not come about easily but require continual 
investments and effort (Dougherty, 1992; Bechky 2003a, 2003b; Carlile, 2002; Carlile and Reben-
tisch, 2003). As outlined in the following section, firms have the potential to form epistemic com-
munities in their own right, putting them in a privileged position to overcome the obstacles asso-
ciated with knowledge processes crossing the epistemic boundaries of heterogeneous occupational 
and functional groups (Nightingale, 2000; Sosa, Eppinger and Rowles, 2004).    
 
5. Firms as epistemic communities  
Membership in the community of a firm provides identity and has both enabling and motivational 
consequences. Like other epistemic communities, those formed by firms and other organizations are 
defined by the uniqueness of the theories, codes, and tools that their members share; in the case of 
firms, these translate into organizational culture, common vocabulary, and boundary objects (Figure 
3). 
COMMON
VOCABULARY
BOUNDARY
OBJECTS
ORGANIZATIONAL
CULTURE
 
Figure 3  Firms as epistemic communities 
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The term ‘organizational culture’ is here used as a shorthand to indicate both articulated ‘theories’ 
and unarticulated beliefs and cognitive maps that guide organizational decision-making by provid-
ing the shared knowledge infrastructure necessary for efficient knowledge integration (Crémer 
1993; Grant 1996a.). In Schein’s (1985, p. 7) classical definition, these “… assumptions and beliefs 
are learned responses to a group’s problems of survival and to problems of internal integration. 
They come to be taken for granted because they solve those problems repeatedly and reliably.” 
Whether tacit or explicit, the mental maps of organizational culture provide guidelines regarding 
relevant cause-effect relationships and facilitate discourse among people of otherwise different cog-
nitive backgrounds (Smircich, 1983; Choo, 1998). Moreover, strong and successful organizational 
cultures provide their members with a sense of identity and a sense of motivation that helps align 
incentives among different groups (Ouchi 1980; Wilkins and Ouchi 1983; Kogut and Zander 1996; 
Osterloh and Frey 2000).   
  
A second central characteristic of firms is their ability to provide their members with a common 
language or code (Arrow 1974; Crémer 1993). Sometimes, local terminologies are canonically pre-
scribed in company manuals, but oftentimes spontaneously developed local jargon is equally 
important in facilitating communication among community members (Allen, 1977; Brown and 
Duguid, 1991; Orr, 1996). Once acquired, local codes tend to be taken for granted and their mastery 
is largely tacit. While local codes enhance intra-organizational knowledge exchange, their tacit, 
‘taken-for-granted’ character is sometimes problematic. Idiosyncratic codes create problems of 
communication across organizational boundaries, but may, of course, be a means to appropriate 
private knowledge rents (Kogut and Zander 1992). 
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Thirdly, firms and other organizations are supported not only by cognitive schemata and intangible 
codes but also by tangible physical artifacts that bridge the epistemic boundaries of the specialized 
occupational and functional groups of which they are composed (Carlile 2002; Bechky 2003a; 
2003b; Star 1989). Such boundary objects “…inhabit several communities of practice and satisfy 
the informational requirements of each of them. In working practice, they are objects that are able 
both to cross borders and maintain some sort of constant identity (Bowker and Star 1999, p. 16)”. 
Modern computer and information systems are pervasive examples of dedicated boundary objects, 
but many other physical manifestations of knowledge, such as drawings, prototypes and physical 
products can serve the same purpose (Bechky 2003a; Carlile 2002). 
 
The formation of firms as epistemic communities, i.e. the creation and maintenance of organiza-
tional culture, a common language and efficient boundary objects, does not come about automati-
cally but requires investment and effort on the part both of the firms’ owners and managers and of 
their employees. Some of these investments have value also in alternative usage. The computer 
hardware of a management information system can be sold and used in another company and many 
of the skills that employees acquire in their jobs can be exploited in other firms. However, a large 
portion of the physical and intangible assets needed to establish the firm as an epistemic community 
is highly situational and cannot readily be transferred to applications outside the organizational con-
text where they were created. Arrow (1974, p. 56), discussing the role of firm specific codes, noted 
that “learning the information channels within a firm and the codes for transmitting information 
through them is… a skill of value only internally”. Therefore, “…the learning of a code by an indi-
vidual is an act of irreversible investment for him. It is therefore also an irreversible capital accu-
mulation for the organization (Arrow 1974, p. 55).”12 
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The requisite transaction specific investments are difficult to realize under market forms of govern-
ance. Conversely, and this is, in fact, often the very reason they are undertaken, such investments 
can provide unique and difficult-to-imitate capabilities (Hennart 1994). As Bob Grant perceptively 
argued,   
… the critical source of competitive advantage is knowledge integration rather than 
knowledge itself. Specialized knowledge cannot, on its own, provide a basis for sus-
tainable competitive advantage, first, because the specialized knowledge resides in 
individuals, and individuals are transferable between firms; second, because the rents 
generated by specialized knowledge is more likely to be appropriated by individuals 
than by the firm. (Grant, 1996b, p. 380) 
 
6. Implications  
In a scathing critique of the ‘competence perspective’ to strategic management – and, by implica-
tion, the knowledge based theory of the firm – Oliver Williamson (1999) called attention to its 
failure to provide clear and operationalizable definitions of key terms, such as ‘competence’ and 
‘knowledge’. As outlined above, the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ provides a means to 
address this core weakness. Its emphasis on the inherently context-dependent nature of knowledge 
provides not only a new and less abstract definition of knowledge and a new taxonomy of knowl-
edge processes. It also suggests the contours of a new research agenda, the central aspects of which 
can be provisionally delineated in terms of five ‘moves’ employed by Williamson (1999) when 
‘benchmarking’ the competence view with the transaction cost perspective:13 
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6.1 Human actors 
The cognitive assumptions underlying the notion of epistemic communities are broadly consistent 
with but also considerably richer and more precise than those of ‘bounded rationality’ and ‘tacit 
knowledge’ that have dominated the knowledge based literature since Richard Nelson and Sidney 
Winter’s (1988) seminal work.14 Whereas bounded rationality in Nelson and Winter and in much of 
the subsequent knowledge based literature appears as a ‘background argument’ (Foss, 2003, p. 193) 
and the assumed importance of tacit knowledge takes center piece, the opposite characterizes the 
behavioral assumptions underlying the idea of epistemic communities. The problems involved in 
the transfer and exchange of tacit knowledge are recognized, but is assumed that the ability of indi-
viduals to engage in knowledge transactions is primarily determined by their epistemic back-
grounds, rather than by the degree of tacitness of the knowledge they hold. Within epistemic com-
munities, individuals often possess the same tacit, experiential knowledge or can with relative ease 
pass it on in personal contact; when this is not the case, it can often be articulated within shared 
symbolic and theoretical frames. Knowledge transactions between communities face more deep-
seated difficulties, determined not only by tacitness but more fundamentally by the degree of 
incommensurability of cognitive frames.  In contrast to the view of bounded rationality as originally 
suggested by Herbert Simon (1947) – the cognitive capabilities of human agents are not primarily 
seen as bounded by the ‘information handling capacity’ of the human brain, but by the limits 
imposed by frames of reference, value systems and modes of symbolic representation prevailing in 
the epistemic communities to which they belong. 
 
In terms of motivational assumptions, Holzner’s (1968) discussion suggests that intra-community 
transactions are influenced by perceived loyalty and sense of identity, but that they are also gov-
erned by considerations of mutual self-interest and authority-imposed obligations. In contrast to 
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intra-community exchanges, both intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors reduce the probability 
that an agent will behave opportunistically in interaction with her peers. 
 
6.2 Unit of analysis 
Framing knowledge processes in terms of interactions between agents belonging to specific epis-
temic communities implies that individual ‘knowledge transactions’ constitute the most basic unit 
of analysis. Knowledge transactions occur when through the interaction of individual agents the 
capabilities of one or both increase. Sometimes transactions leave tangible traces documenting their 
occurrence and attributes, but many are unrecorded, intangible and more difficult to observe. 
Although empirical methodologies will therefore vary, key attributes for the operationalization of 
such transactions include (1) the epistemic characteristics of the interacting partners, (2) the purpose 
of their interaction, (3) its costs (in terms of time and travel, for example), as well as (4) expected or 
realized benefits.    
 
6.3 Describing the firm 
Depending on their relative emphases, different contributors to the competence perspective vari-
ously conceived the firm as a bundle of resources, capabilities or competences. The perspective 
outlined in this paper suggests a complementary perspective, viewing the firm in terms of the num-
ber, size and characteristics of the epistemic communities of its employees, and in terms of the 
structure of interaction within and between such communities. Being less abstract, it is also much 
more amenable to empirical observation. 
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6.4 Purposes served  
A key criterion in Williamson’s (1999) benchmarking of the capability perspective with that of 
transaction cost economics was the theory’s ability to explain (or predict) the alignment of transac-
tions with different attributes to appropriate modes of governance. The gist of Williamson’s critique 
was that the competence perspective could not well predict when hierarchic governance is preferred 
to markets or when markets prevail. “Given that all firms are repositories of knowledge and that all 
firms develop interpersonal relations, the question is when this is best done in separate firms rather 
than in one (Williamson, 1999, p. 1097).”  
 
According to Bruce Kogut and Udo Zander (1992, p. 384), “…what firms do better than markets is 
the sharing and transfer of the knowledge of individuals and groups within an organization.” In their 
view, firms exist because they can provide superior conditions for the management of productive 
activities involving tacit knowledge. The argument developed in this paper implies that firms are 
more efficient than markets not primarily in the governance of knowledge processes involving tacit 
knowledge but of those that require the integration or combination of knowledge originating in dif-
ferent epistemic communities when the interfaces between them are not clearly defined. The supe-
riority of firms in this respect derives from their ability to form epistemic communities in their own 
right, thereby providing both motivational and enabling advantages that cannot easily be replicated 
through market contracting. In the case of knowledge processes involving articulation and replica-
tion of knowledge within the same epistemic community firm governance brings no additional bene-
fits. In these cases, hierarchy may for other reasons, such as those set out in inherited transaction 
cost theory, be the preferred mode of governance, but not because it is inherently superior to mar-
kets in governing these sorts of knowledge processes. 
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6.5 Empirical 
Applying Holzner’s concept of epistemic communities to the problem of knowledge governance 
opens up a rich field for empirical research on both micro- and macroeconomic levels, focusing on 
the description, analysis and theoretical explanation of the structure of the knowledge systems in 
society (the problem that Holzner (1968) and Holzner and Marx (1979) theoretically address with-
out systematic empirical underpinnings) and in individual organizations. Together with the devel-
opment of requisite theoretical advances, this area of research could perhaps, analogous to ‘indus-
trial organization’ be denoted ‘epistemic organization’. Whereas ‘industrial organization’ has char-
acterized and studied individuals, establishments and firms according to the nature of the goods and 
services they produce, ‘epistemic organization’ would provide a complementary view, characteriz-
ing and studying individuals by their professions (or other epistemic communities to which they 
belong) and establishments and firms by the structure and composition of the epistemic communi-
ties they encompass.  
 
7. Concluding summary     
This paper argues that the so called knowledge based view of the firm has tended to misleadingly 
overemphasize the importance of ‘tacit knowledge’ for the choice of governance of knowledge-
intensive processes. Employing a social-constructivist view of knowledge and the concept of ‘epis-
temic communities’, as developed by Burkhart Holzner (1968) and Holzner and John Marx (1979), 
it argues that the ease or difficulty of managing knowledge-intensive interactions is more dependent 
on the cognitive background of the exchange partners than on the characteristics of the knowledge 
they exchange (c.f. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Zahra and George (2002)). 
 
 29
The proposed conceptualization offers a means to reconcile and synthesize the literature on the 
knowledge based approach to the theory of the firm. It suggests a simple typology of four basic 
knowledge processes:  Replication and articulation involve cooperative efforts within epistemic 
communities, i.e. among individuals who share a commitment to a common practice and mastery of 
its epistemic base; integration and combination require coordination and reconciliation of knowl-
edge across epistemic communities, whose members are often unfamiliar with one another’s spe-
cialized codes, theories and tools. Whereas common community membership provides motivational 
and enabling conditions that facilitate within-community interaction, exchange of knowledge across 
different communities is often fraught with difficulties. Since firms have the potential to form epis-
temic communities in their own right - conferring on their members the means by which specialist 
knowledge can be effectively combined and integrated – hierarchy is generally superior to markets 
in the governance of between-community cooperation in the form of integration and combination. 
There is no a priori reason to assume that firms are generally superior to markets for the organiza-
tion of replication and articulation – knowledge processes involving people belonging to the same 
epistemic community. 
 
The establishment of a firm as a ‘community of communities’ requires the development of a shared 
codes, theory and tools, i.e. common vocabulary, organizational culture and boundary objects. 
Many of the associated investments are highly situational and cannot easily be transferred to other 
contexts The employment of ‘firms’ rather than ‘markets’ in the creation of “social communities of 
voluntaristic action” (Kogut and Zander 1992) reflects not only their motivational and enabling 
advantages but also their ability to mitigate the moral hazards associated with the transaction 
specific investments necessary to establish them as epistemic communities. 
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Applying the concept of epistemic communities to the problem of knowledge governance opens up 
a rich field of research, the contours of which are sketched in the penultimate section of the paper. 
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Endnotes 
1 The seminal contributions by Bruce Kogut and Udo Zander (1992, 1993 and Zander & Kogut, 1995), for 
example, were based on the critical but unstated assumption that the characteristics of manufacturing 
technologies, such as their degree of ‘codifiability’, remain constant over several decades. The present paper 
takes the view that articulation, the process whereby tacit skills and knowledge are made explicit, and 
codification, the process of rendering articulated knowledge in fixed, standardized and easily replicable 
form, are fundamental to the dynamics of knowledge creation (Håkanson, 2007).  
2 Williamson, of course, was not totally impartial in this debate. As he admitted, the choice of benchmarking 
criteria may have stacked the cards against the former in favor of the latter and the comparison “… could 
be… unfair…, in that competence is asked to play on transaction cost turf. (1999, p. 1094).”  
3 The minimum community size is two; there are forms of knowledge that only lovers share and can appreci-
ate. Other kinds of knowledge seem so universal that they are probably shared by all human beings. Most 
types of knowledge relevant in managerial practice and for economic theory – the types that this paper 
attempts to address – lie between these two extremes. 
4 Deborah Dougherty (1992), following Douglas’ (1987) retranslation of Fleck’s (1935/1979) 
‘Denkkollektiv’ (‘thought-collective’), used the term ‘thought worlds’ to denote the beliefs and perceptions 
common to members of functional departments. Boland and Tenkasi (1995) used the phrase ‘communities of 
knowing’, Bechky (2003a; 2003b) preferred ‘occupational communities’ while Grant (1996a) and Carlile 
(2002) discussed ‘expert knowledge’ primarily in terms of business functions. John Seely Brown and Paul 
Duguid (2001b, p. 205) proposed the term ‘networks of practice', quoting the works of Strauss (1978, 1982, 
1984) on ‘social worlds’, Knorr Cetina (1999) on ‘epistemic cultures’ and Ziman (1967) on ‘public 
knowledge’ in scientific communities. As discussed below, a separate tradition defined ‘epistemic communi-
ties’ as small groups of heterogeneous knowledge-creating agents pursuing a common goal and accepting a 
common ‘procedural authority’ (Cohendet and Llerena 2003, p. 283; Cowan et al., 2000, p. 234). In subse-
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quent elaboration of this usage, the concept came to take on a meaning almost the opposite of Holzner’s 
(1968) original definition (and the one adopted in this paper). Bart Nooteboom (2006, pp. 2f.), for example, 
defined ‘epistemic communities as “…groups or networks of people who perform exploratory learning. They 
engage in transdisciplinary and/or transfunctional activities, at the interstices between the various disciplines. 
In contrast with communities of practice, they are not organized around a common discipline or practice but 
around a common topic or problem.” Based on Holzner and Marx (1979), the concept is has also been 
employed in the field of international relations to denote communities whose members (1) share a common 
set of values and beliefs, (2) have common theoretical understanding regarding causalities regarding policy 
measures and desired outcomes, (3) have shared criteria for validity, and (4) pursue the same policy 
enterprise (Haas, 1992).      
5 Although individual communities of practice usually belong to larger epistemic communities, and epistemic 
communities are often composed of many localized communities of practice, the definitions do not rule out 
the possibility that specific communities of practice may develop such unique epistemic characteristics that 
they could be considered to be separate epistemic communities.      
6 The classification of epistemic communities – like that of industries - is complicated by the fact that their 
boundaries are not constant. As the knowledge base of a community expands, its practice and membership 
often change reciprocally (Brown and Duguid, 1998, p. 96). Such epistemic differentiation increases the role 
complexity and repertory of frames of reference and cognitive orientations of society, with individuals 
typically belonging simultaneously to several epistemic communities (Holzner, 1968, p. 69). This tendency 
parallels the way that industrial establishments often produce goods and services belonging to different 
industries.  
7 Economists have traditionally focussed on knowledge as information, i.e. propositional knowledge; many 
sociologists have emphasized its practical aspects, i.e. knowledge as capabilities. However, the two are 
clearly so intertwined that in the present context it is almost impossible to discuss the one without the other. 
Cognitive understanding in the form of propositional knowledge derives its economic significance through 
application in the performance of an economically meaningful activity, i.e. the exercise of the skill that it 
informs. Michael Polanyi (1966, p. 7) took a similar position: ‘‘These two aspects of knowing have similar 
structure and neither is ever present without the other . . . I shall always speak of ‘knowing’ therefore, to 
cover both practical and theoretical knowledge.’’  
8 The ‘knowledge’ informing skilled practice includes not only cognitive understanding of the principles that 
determine its performance but also a more or less vital tacit component: “Knowledge is applied to practice in 
the sense that the theoretical principles of universal validity become the ground for the formulation of the 
principles of practice. However, there is no way in which practice can be directly deduced from theory. 
There is always remains an element of judgment through which the practitioner ‘distinguishes whether 
something is the case or not’ (Holzner and Marx, 1979, p. 36).”  
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9 Holzner (1968) and Holzner and Marx (1979) do not explicitly discuss the roles of tools and other artifacts. 
They are included here because they are basic to the methodologies available to a community and central to 
its frames of reference. By extending the efficiency of the human body, as well as man’s senses and intellect 
(Rogers, 1983, p. 2; Håkanson, 2007), tools help determine the capabilities of a community, i.e. the range 
and efficiency of the tasks it can perform as well as the range, precision and reliability of its observations of 
reality. Tools and artifacts are important both as outcomes of a community’s effort and as means to evaluate 
such outcomes (Garud and Rappa, 1994).  Moreover, competent mastery of its tools is a significant criterion 
of community membership (Brown, Collins and Duguid, 1989; Delamont and Atkinson, 2001).     
10 This may help to explain the (unexpected) finding by Zander and Kogut (1995), that the hazard of 
involuntary imitation manufacturing technologies is unrelated to their ‘codifiability’. 
11 “The maintenance of the specific role orientation… is based on powerful motivational forces… They may 
involve control by peers, the supervision by authority figures, the reference to an explicit code, as well as the 
situational requirements of the encountered tasks themselves (Holzner, 1968, pp. 94 f.).” 
12 For employees, mastery of the codes, theory and tools of a firm-specific epistemic community adds to their 
value and negotiating strength vis-à-vis that particular employer. Firms, in turn, have an incentive to let their 
employees appropriate some of that value since it creates barriers to their mobility, thereby reducing the 
threat of imitation (Williamson 1985; Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988; Peteraf 1993). 
13 I leave out Williamson’s sixth ‘move’ – ‘efficiency criterion’ – which appears too general to be useful for 
the present purpose.  
14 As pointed out by Foss (2003) and Paul Nightingale (2003), the epistemological basis of bounded 
rationality, as developed by Herbert Simon (1947), and that of tacit knowledge according to Polanyi (1962, 
1966) do not, in fact, easily match. The social constructivist approach proposed here avoids this problem. 
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